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Abstract 
A complete understanding of the psychology of social identity requires not only descriptions 
of how social identification processes work, but also an account of why the underlying 
psychological mechanisms have evolved. This chapter focuses on the evolution of coalitional 
(or “tribal”) social identity (i.e., the type of social identity associated with nationality, 
ethnicity, religion, and class). Coalitional social identity appears to involve a readiness to 
incur costs for the collective, which may yield cooperative benefits. However, it has not been 
obvious why reaping the benefits of intragroup cooperation would be facilitated by social 
identification processes. We suggest that social identity may be related to the signaling of 
coalitional membership and cooperative intent. Specifically, we argue that social identity may 
constitute a self-represented summary of the loyalty-signaling characteristics that one has 
acquired. Based on this hypothesized ultimate function of social identity, we derive 
predictions regarding the proximate psychology of social identity. We suggest that further 
research may examine whether social identity involves private social identities (for balancing 
costs and benefits of group membership) and public social identities (for strategically 
influencing the behavior of others). 
 
Keywords: coalitions; cooperation; evolution; group; loyalty; reciprocity; signal; social 
identity; trust 
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Evolutionary Perspectives on Social Identity 
1. Introduction 
Here’s a hypothetical conversation between two psychology students: 
“What is identity?” 
“I think an individual’s identity is made up of their self-concept, which is like a list of 
attributes they associate with themselves.” 
“OK. Does the self-concept have any form or structure? Can the list of attributes be 
organized in any way?” 
“There seems to be some organization. Some attributes are related to individual 
characteristics, such as favorite foods and personality traits; other attributes are related to the 
groups an individual belongs to, such as nationality and occupation. I think the latter are what 
psychologists call social identity.” 
“Alright, so what does an individual’s social identity do? I mean, assuming that it 
results from the operation of psychological mechanisms, what do those mechanisms do? 
What would be their function? We know that we have eyes for seeing and a motor cortex for 
moving—what are the psychological mechanisms underlying social identity for?” 
“I think you’re asking two separate questions. Regarding what social identity does, we 
can try to answer this by investigating its effects on other psychological processes and 
behaviors. This is about how social identity works. I think we can learn about this by reading 
the social psychological literature. Your question about what social identity mechanisms are 
for is interesting. You’re asking why we have social identity at all. I don’t know. Let’s ask 
our social psychology professor.” 
(End of conversation.) 
The scientific study of behavior and the mind took an important step forward with the 
recognition that complete explanations require not only investigations of how mental and 
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behavioral processes work, but also analyses of why they may have evolved. In the realm of 
human behavior, this approach—most vigorously advocated by evolutionary psychologists—
has been highly fruitful, not only offering ultimate explanations for many behavioral 
tendencies, but also stimulating the generation of entirely new hypotheses (Barkow, 
Cosmides, & Tooby 1992; Buss, 2005; Dunbar & Barrett, 2007). In this chapter, we apply 
this perspective to the phenomenon of social identity, attempting to shed some light on how it 
works and, more crucially, why it exists. To give away the ending, we do not have definitive 
answers to the why question, but we aim to highlight the sorts of questions that must be asked 
and issues that must be considered in order for psychologists to move toward a complete 
account of the phenomenon. Let us begin with a quick overview of phenomena that seem 
related to social identity and that any good theory of social identity should be able to explain. 
Most conspicuously, social identity plays a role in human conflict: Numerous wars 
and genocides throughout human history have focused on conquering or destroying some 
“other” people. Such conflicts may take place on the scale of nations, tribes, gangs, or 
families (e.g., Pinker, 2011). Analyses of deadly ethnic riots suggest that enraged individuals 
who are ready to commit atrocities may attend to identity and refrain from harming members 
of untargeted ethnic groups (Horowitz, 2001). Even between nations who are on friendly 
terms, simply being foreign usually entails restrictions on individuals, such as not being 
allowed to enter the country, not being allowed to work, not being entitled to the full set of 
social benefits, and not being allowed to vote in elections, to name only a few. As both 
authors of this chapter have experienced firsthand, foreignness imposes difficulties when 
interacting with formal institutions. For instance, not being able to provide standard 
documentation (e.g., tax return, utility bill) makes it difficult to secure accommodation, open 
a bank account, obtain health insurance, and sign contracts with utility providers. One can 
easily imagine the proverbial Martian observing the people of Earth and wondering why 
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people treat those born on one side of an imaginary line so differently from those born on the 
other side of the imaginary line. 
Of course, social identity is not limited to geographical origin, ethnicity, and 
nationality because it can also be associated with religion, ideology, social status, and 
occupation. Furthermore, many social identities are associated with rituals—for example, 
Thanksgiving for North Americans, Oktoberfest for Bavarians, Koningsdag for non-
republican Dutch, or pierced-and-barefooted mountain climbing for some Mauritian Hindus 
(Xygalatas et al., 2013). Social identity can engender feelings of pride (e.g., when your team 
wins) and anger (e.g., when a foreigner insults your nation) as well as efforts to retaliate 
against perceived wrongdoings or insults. In addition, people are very curious about other 
people’s social identity. Most people who have migrated or traveled have been asked where 
they are from. While this may seem trivial, there are many other (probably more informative) 
idiosyncratic data (e.g., medical or psychiatric conditions, political preference) that seem to 
have lower priority or are not part of common inquiry at all. This intense interest in social 
identity can sometimes be problematic; at least anecdotally, many children of immigrants 
resent constantly being asked where they are from. 
 Finally, rudiments of social identity are evident across animal species. Many animals 
appear capable of distinguishing between kin and non-kin (e.g., Buchan, Alberts, Silk, & 
Altmann, 2003; Sherman, 1977; Todrank, Heth, & Johnston, 1998). And nonhuman primates 
display behaviors suggesting more advanced forms of social identity, distinguishing members 
of their own group from those of other groups. Observations of an island colony of rhesus 
macaques revealed that most of the copulations involved members of the same group, 
whereas between-group interactions were often agonistic (Boelkins & Wilson, 1972). 
Japanese macaques also seem capable of a sense of group membership. Although these 
monkeys tend to live in groups with overlapping nomadic ranges (i.e., the range of one group 
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overlaps with the range of another group), intergroup contact observed at feeding places 
frequently involved monkeys driving away members of other troops and responding to 
attacks on their troop members from other troops (Kawanaka, 1973). Similarly, male 
chimpanzees form coalitions, and they raid other coalitions and attack intruders (e.g., Boehm, 
1999). As humans seem to possess a more elaborate psychology of social identity than do 
other primates, any good theory of social identity should be able to account for why human 
psychology is more—rather than less—entangled with social identity.  
 
2. Psychological approaches to social identity 
 As noted above, there are many different kinds of social identity. This implies that 
people are capable of (and have a penchant for) carving up the social world in multiple ways. 
To account for the diverse instances of social identification, one approach is to prioritize 
parsimony and attempt to specify a common mechanism underlying all the varieties of social 
identity. This approach is epitomized by social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986), 
which invokes a stripped-down, all-purpose mechanism to explain the antecedents and 
consequences of social identification. This approach has conferred certain benefits, and it has 
propelled social psychological research on this important phenomenon. However, just as 
domain-general approaches to emotions can mask important nuances (e.g., not all “negative” 
emotions are alike), invoking a general social identity mechanism may mask important 
nuances as well. This is because the groups and categories that separate people in the real 
world are of many qualitatively different types which are often grounded in distinct 
evolutionary foundations (Park, 2012). 
 Consider the case of gender identity. In all known human cultures people divide 
themselves up into sex-based categories and have sex-based division of labor (Brown, 1991). 
While some aspects of gender identification are undoubtedly due to culture, it is likely that 
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heterosexual mating underlies much of the basic perceptions of the two sexes, and it is likely 
that sex differences in dispositions (e.g., aggressiveness, upper-body strength) give rise to 
different perceptions of men and women. For most humans, their gender identity may be the 
earliest developing, most robust, and longest lasting social identity (Martin & Ruble, 2004). 
At the same time, sex-based identity lacks some of the key characteristics of social identity 
described above, such as intergroup conflict and segregation (even the most sex-segregated 
societies are not interested in keeping men and women apart permanently—no society 
attempts to keep men and women on different sides of a guarded border). It is thus unlikely 
that psychological processes underlying gender identity overlap fully with those underlying 
identities based on nationality, ethnicity, religion, etc. 
A similar argument might be made for age-based identity, which seems to be distinct 
from gender identity. Identification with an age group varies across life stages and cohorts 
(e.g., young vs. old, adult, born in the 60s). Like gender identity, age identity is not associated 
with intergroup conflict or total segregation. In contrast to gender identity, age identity 
necessarily changes over time. For the remainder of the chapter, we set aside gender and age 
identities (which have qualitatively distinct characteristics) and focus on the type of social 
identity associated with nationality, ethnicity, religion, and class—which has received the 
most attention in social psychology and which appears to be a manifestation of coalitional (or 
“tribal”) psychology (Cosmides, Tooby, & Kurzban, 2003). 
 Much social psychological research has attempted to understand groups (e.g., 
Reicher, Haslam, Spears, & Reynolds, 2012). Social psychologists have used this term 
somewhat loosely, and it is important to distinguish groups (a collective of individuals with a 
capacity for cooperating toward a common goal) from social categories (the categories or 
stereotypes individuals employ during person perception and impression formation, e.g., male 
vs. female, young vs. old, White vs. Black; Brubaker, 2002; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Kinzler, 
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Shutts, & Correll, 2010) and social identities (those parts of individuals’ self-concepts 
derived from groups and social categories). Whereas most groups may be based on or give 
rise to social categories, most social categories are not groups (Brubaker, 2002). Furthermore, 
whereas all groups and social categories may give rise to social identities, not all social 
identities are based on actual groups or commonly employed social categories. Below we 
focus on the psychological mechanisms underlying an individual’s social identity. 
 A useful tool afforded by an evolutionary psychological perspective is the “function-
to-form” approach, which consists of “reverse engineering” a trait (e.g., Buss, 1995; Pinker, 
1997; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). Consider how the proverbial Martian would attempt to 
understand a human-engineered system, such as an automobile. One strategy would involve 
taking it apart and listing the properties of all of its parts (e.g., material, shape, location inside 
the automobile, and connections with other parts). Another strategy would be starting with a 
conjecture about the function of the automobile. For example, the Martian might conjecture 
that the function of an automobile is locomotion1. The Martian may then combine this 
conjecture with other knowledge and assumptions to formulate hypotheses regarding the 
characteristics of the automobile and the mechanisms that make it move—its form. (For 
example, knowledge about aerodynamics might be used to formulate hypotheses about the 
external shape of the automobile, and knowledge of mechanics might be used to formulate 
hypotheses about the characteristics of those parts of the car touching the terrain.) Of course, 
during the process of investigating how the automobile moves, the function-to-form approach 
will benefit from a catalog of all the parts and their properties. However, in the absence of 
knowledge about function, even the most thorough cataloging is unlikely to lead to a proper 
understanding of the automobile. 
                                                 
1 For some, it might seem obvious that the function of an automobile is locomotion. However, for a naïve 
observer, the function may not be obvious at all. The observer may note that an automobile burns fuel, disrupts 
air flow, makes noise, and sometimes causes accidents, and take any one of these to be its function. Obviously, 
different conjectures regarding function (e.g., locomotion vs. fuel burning) yield different hypotheses regarding 
form. 
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3. Conjecture about function: Tribal social identity may be for forging group loyalty  
 To the extent that social identification involves forming a representation of oneself as 
a member of a collective, what functions might be served by this process? This question 
touches on a broader question regarding what functions are served by possessing self-
representations at all. Various views have been expressed on this issue, and one influential 
theory is that humans evolved to experience symbolic self-awareness, which allows humans 
to regulate their own behavior in accordance with expectations regarding the consequences of 
their actions (Sedikides & Skowronski, 1997). A key component of this argument is that 
symbolic self-awareness allows humans to anticipate how their behavior will impact their 
social standing—that is, how they are evaluated by others. Given the importance of social 
acceptance (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), it is indeed plausible that a sense of public self (the 
self as seen by others) became highly developed in humans, along with affective 
mechanisms—such as the sociometer (Leary, 2012)—designed to motivate context-specific 
adaptive behavior. 
 Of course, social identity, in its fully-fledged form, involves more than a motivation 
to be socially accepted—it involves a readiness to incur costs for the collective (Van Vugt & 
Hart, 2004). This phenomenon is readily observed in competitive intergroup contexts in 
which competition drives up both group identification and (potentially personally costly) 
intragroup cooperation (Van Vugt, De Cremer, & Janssen, 2007). The links between social 
identity, intergroup competition, and intragroup cooperation imply that a key driver of human 
social identity may be contexts involving competitive (and often hostile) intergroup 
encounters that have featured throughout human evolution (Bowles, 2009). We can thus 
begin to get a handle on why identification with “tribal” groups (or their contemporary 
analogues, such as national and ethnic groups) is associated with psychological processes that 
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are largely absent in identification with non-tribal social categories (such as genders and 
ages). In short, tribal social identity may serve the function of solidifying coalitional 
alliances, allowing members to reap the benefits of intragroup cooperation (and intergroup 
competition). 
 The finding that group identification is associated with a readiness to incur costs for 
the collective does not in itself explain why reaping the benefits of intragroup cooperation 
would be contingent on such identification. In other words, it is not obvious why reaping the 
benefits of intragroup cooperation is facilitated by solidifying alliances and, crucially, what 
role social identity plays in solidifying alliances. Could not a few individuals simply agree to 
cooperate on an ad hoc basis? No, because there is a key evolutionary problem: For each of 
those individuals, there is always a risk of cooperating with cheaters (i.e., non-reciprocators), 
such that unconditional cooperation is not an evolutionarily stable strategy (e.g., Cosmides & 
Tooby, 2013). A capacity to signal coalitional membership and cooperative intent would be 
beneficial, and social identity may serve this function. 
 Imagine three individuals, two of whom have already formed an alliance (say, the 
“Reds”). The third individual (X) might want to join the alliance and reap the benefits of 
cooperation. From the perspective of the Reds, cooperating with X may end up being costly 
(if X is a cheater). Therefore, X must do something to convince the Reds that she can be 
trusted to cooperate so that the Reds will allow her to join the alliance. As a start, X can 
signal to the Reds something like: “I am like you, and I will cooperate exclusively with you.” 
Is there any reason why the Reds would believe in the veracity of this signal? If X publicly 
signals that she is like the Reds and will cooperate with them, then an alliance that is in 
competition with the Reds—say, the “Blues”—will have all the more reason to distrust X and 
will likely exclude X from their alliance of Blues. Thus, by publicly signaling identification 
with the Reds, X forfeits any potential benefits of cooperating with the Blues. In other words, 
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in an environment of competing alliances, signaling membership (or loyalty) to one alliance 
carries inherent opportunity costs. That X incurs costs by proclaiming social identification 
with the Reds thus provides a reason for the Reds to start trusting X. The opportunity costs 
create an incentive for X to cooperate, as becoming excluded from the Reds may result in X 
not being part of any alliance. Therefore, social identification may both signal and motivate 
cooperation. 
 Importantly, the signaling of tribal social identity need not involve a verbal statement 
as in the example above. The signals may involve publicly observable characteristics that the 
individual can modify to some extent, such as dress, language, accent, rituals, and 
nonstandard beliefs and attitudes, to the extent that the signals entail (opportunity) costs that 
motivate the individual to remain in the alliance. Given the need to signal potentially shifting 
alliances, humans are unlikely to have evolved to perceive unchangeable characteristics—
such as skin color—as reliable social identity signals, although they may serve as proxies 
under certain circumstances (Kurzban, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001). Tribal social identity, 
then, may be a self-represented summary of the loyalty-signaling characteristics that one has 
acquired. The fact that signals work best when they are “honest” and genuinely internalized 
(e.g., Von Hippel & Trivers, 2011; Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997) helps explain why individuals 
possess social identity that simultaneously imposes costs and motivates behavior. 
 
4. Predictions about form: The psychology of social identification 
 To the extent that tribal social identity serves the function of signaling and motivating 
cooperation, a number of hypotheses can be formulated regarding its psychological 
characteristics (i.e., its form). First, as signaling one’s loyalties is superfluous in a social 
environment in which intergroup competition is absent, and as signaling one’s loyalties may 
be especially likely to yield benefits in a social environment with intergroup competition, 
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tribal social identification may increase under conditions of intergroup competition. Second, 
tribal social identification is likely to lead to discriminatory behavior with regard to 
alternative groups—not only ingroup favoritism, but antipathy toward outgroups. As already 
mentioned, there is evidence that (perceived) intergroup competition/conflict increases social 
identification with familiar “tribal” groups (Van Vugt & Hart, 2004; Van Vugt & Park, 
2010). There is also ample evidence that social identification results in discrimination—
indeed, this is the focal phenomenon studied by researchers inspired by social identity theory 
(Brewer, 1999). An evolutionary perspective introduces additional nuances to these 
processes. Most notably, antipathies toward tribal outgroups are specific, characterized by 
psychological mechanisms that facilitate avoidance and exclusion (Kurzban & Leary, 2001; 
Schaller, Park, & Faulkner, 2003). More generally, perceived threats from outgroups lead to 
greater ingroup favoritism and xenophobia (Faulkner, Schaller, Park, & Duncan, 2004). Also, 
consistent with the male warrior hypothesis (i.e., males have historically been more highly 
involved in intergroup conflict and thus men’s psychology is relatively more specialized for 
intergroup conflict), the effect of intergroup competition on social identification is stronger in 
men than women (Van Vugt et al., 2007). We would also expect men to be more frequent 
targets of social identity–based discrimination, which has been empirically demonstrated 
(Navarrete, McDonald, Molina, & Sidanius, 2010). 
 More speculatively, because the risk of cooperating with cheaters is ever-present, 
there may have evolved psychological features that allow individuals to maximize their 
fitness gains in cooperative contexts: (a) sensitivity to other group members’ levels of loyalty, 
which can be used to calibrate one’s own level; (b) slightly exaggerated perceptions of one’s 
own level of loyalty and commitment, which is readily displayed to others; and (c) tactics 
intended to increase other group members’ levels of sacrifice. In other words, social 
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identification may be strategic, with individuals aiming for beneficial rather than 
disadvantageous memberships, and being highly sensitive to context. 
 The idea that individuals may strategically perceive and display exaggerated levels of 
group loyalty is consistent with recent theoretical perspectives suggesting that the self may be 
organized in a modular, functionally specialized manner, comprising a part of the mind 
whose key function is to represent the self in the best possible light, allowing individuals to 
more effectively persuade others (Kurzban & Aktipis, 2007). This perspective proposes that 
while there may be parts of the mind that represent true beliefs (and serve to influence one’s 
own behavior), there may be parts that hold plausibly distorted beliefs (and serve to influence 
others’ behavior). For example, recent research on social-welfare attitudes suggests that 
individuals may harbor seemingly contradictory motivations for the purposes of optimizing 
their own goal-directed behavior while attempting to strategically influence others’ behavior 
to their own advantage. Aarøe and Petersen (2013) manipulated participants’ blood glucose 
levels (with lower blood glucose levels serving as a physiological proxy for hunger) and 
assessed their attitudes toward social welfare (which are essentially attitudes about sharing) 
and their actual sharing behavior in an economic game. Hunger increased support for social 
welfare, but had no effect on sharing behavior (in fact, controlling for social welfare attitudes, 
hunger decreased sharing behavior). As such, the manipulation seems to have triggered two 
distinct psychological responses, one private (reduced intentions to share, consistent with the 
goal of obtaining resources for oneself) and one public (increased advocacy of sharing, 
presumably aimed at influencing others’ behavior for one’s own gain). 
 Likewise, in the realm of moral psychology, a distinction has been made between 
moral conscience (which regulates one’s own behavior) and moral condemnation (which 
specializes in judging others in order to influence their behavior; DeScioli & Kurzban, 2013). 
We suggest that an analogous distinction might be usefully made between “private” social 
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identity (which regulates one’s own behavior with respect to incurring costs for the group) 
and “public” social identity (which specializes in signaling one’s commitments to others in 
order to persuade them to incur greater costs for the group). 
A private social identity that motivates cooperation at the risk of incurring costs 
would be associated with at least three measurable aspects of how individuals think and feel 
about social identities. First, individuals should feel that some memberships are more 
important for them than other memberships, with group memberships that are more beneficial 
being perceived as more important. Second, individuals should feel greater loyalty toward the 
more beneficial groups, characterized by greater willingness to incur costs. Third, individuals 
should feel an increase in the importance of a particular social identity (and increase in 
willingness to incur costs) if the loss of that membership becomes more costly. 
A public social identity specializing in signaling one’s loyalties in order to persuade 
others to incur greater costs for the group would be associated with at least three observable 
aspects of how individuals express their social identity. First, signals of the importance of 
memberships (i.e., displays of loyalty) need not be highly correlated with the benefits 
associated with membership. Rather, the expression of loyalties should be a function of both 
identification with a group and whether the situation allows for signals of loyalty to persuade 
others to incur costs for the group. Second, similarly, contributions or sacrifice to the group 
should be contingent on both willingness to incur costs and the extent to which the situation 
allows that the sacrifice persuades others to sacrifice for the group as well. Third, increases in 
the expression of loyalties and publicly incurring costs for the group should be influenced by 
the costs of losing the membership for the individual as well as the costs that would be 
incurred by the individual if others left the coalition. 
Furthermore, an important part of social identity may be inflated beliefs regarding the 
superiority of one’s own group. Not only would such beliefs help to solidify private 
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commitment, but they would also be enthusiastically expressed to signal one’s commitment 
to both ingroup members and competitors. As such proclamations may be used to influence 
other group members’ behavior, publicly expressed social identity may be associated with 
especially exaggerated views concerning the superiority of the ingroup. 
These conjectures point to some intriguing theoretical and empirical implications. 
Because self-reports of social identification are necessarily “public,” previous findings 
relying on self-reports may have been focused specifically on aspects of social identification 
related mostly to exaggerated beliefs and persuasion of others. From this perspective, it is not 
surprising that social psychological investigations of social identity (focusing mostly on the 
public aspect) have recurrently highlighted positive ingroup distinctiveness as a central 
intergroup motive.  It follows that investigations of “private” social identity may require 
measurements that circumvent self-presentation, such as assessment of anonymous costly 
behavior (e.g., Aarøe & Petersen, 2013). 
 As noted above, a good model of social identity should be able to explain social 
identity phenomena. Indeed, the perspective outlined above permits elaborations that explain 
several social identity phenomena. The conjecture that social identity is a (self-represented) 
summary of individuals’ group loyalties seems compatible with the association between 
identity and intergroup conflict, institutional distrust toward members of outgroups, and 
individuals’ curiosity about others’ identity. In addition, the association of identity with 
traditions and rituals can be explained. Individuals in an alliance might use traditions and 
rituals as a way to place (opportunity) costs on group membership and thus increase or 
maintain loyalty and cooperation (Xygalatas et al., 2013). Because social identity plays a 
crucial role in cooperation, the observation that humans are more influenced by social 
identity than are less interdependent primates also makes sense (cf., Brewer, 1999).  
 
Social Identity     16 
5. Alternative perspectives on social identity phenomena 
 Are there alternative perspectives that better account for the phenomena associated 
with social identity? This is, ultimately, an empirical question. However, we would argue that 
the function-to-form approach delineated above has an important conceptual advantage over 
explanations that rely on “intra-psychic needs” (e.g., self-esteem that needs to be protected, 
maintained, or increased; cf. Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Invoking intra-psychic needs raises the 
more basic question of why humans possess such needs, thus pushing back the explanatory 
burden. We briefly discuss what we believe is currently the most important alternative theory 
of tribal social identity.2 
 Optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1999, 2003; Brewer & Caporael, 2006) starts 
from the premise that ingroup–outgroup distinctions do not always involve competition or 
conflict and thus aims to provide an explanation for group identification that does not invoke 
intergroup competition. As humans rely on cooperation for survival, individuals must rely on 
others for information, help, and resources, and individuals must be willing to share 
information, help, and resources with others. Such cooperation requires that individuals trust 
others to cooperate in return. However, trusting others indiscriminately is a suboptimal 
strategy, as this leaves one vulnerable to exploitation by cheaters. A more optimal strategy 
would be to trust others contingently on the probability that they will cooperate in return. 
Social differentiation and group boundaries might be a way for individuals to achieve 
cooperation, by limiting the costs of trusting indiscriminately. Optimal distinctiveness theory 
holds that for the purpose of creating cooperative groups through social differentiation, 
                                                 
2 There are several influential perspectives that are relevant to social identity and intergroup psychology. One 
notable perspective is terror management theory (TMT), which explains many human psychological 
phenomena—including intergroup bias—as resulting from motivations to uphold cultural worldviews (which, in 
turn, exist to assuage anxieties about death). Interestingly, evolutionary psychologists have attempted to explain 
many of the TMT-related phenomena as manifestations of coalitional psychology (e.g., Navarrete & Fessler, 
2005). Thus, this is another example of an explanation relying on intra-psychic needs being updated by a more 
contemporary evolutionary psychological perspective. 
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humans have evolved opposing needs for inclusion (assimilation in groups) and 
differentiation from other individuals: 
When a person feels isolated or detached from any larger social collective, the drive 
for inclusion is aroused; on the other hand, immersion in an excessively large or 
undefined social collective activates the search for differentiation and distinctiveness. 
Equilibrium is achieved through identification with distinctive social groups that meet 
both needs simultaneously. (Brewer, 1999, p. 434) 
 
Optimal distinctiveness theory shares certain assumptions with our arguments 
outlined above (e.g., that it would be maladaptive to trust indiscriminately, that a more 
optimal strategy would be to trust others contingently on the probability that they will 
cooperate in return). However, our perspective differs in the specification of how individuals 
may determine the probabilities that others will reciprocate. Optimal distinctiveness theory 
proposes that individuals may use a somewhat crude heuristic to lower the probability of 
providing benefits to someone who will not reciprocate—that by limiting cooperation to a 
subset of all available others, individuals may reduce the costs of cooperation and still enjoy 
the benefits of cooperation (Brewer, 1999, 2003). By contrast, our arguments outlined above 
entail more specific proposals regarding how individuals might signal cooperative intent and 
specify the reasons other individuals might have for responding favorably to such signals. 
The key difference between optimal distinctiveness and our perspective is that we see 
intergroup competition/conflict as providing a necessary footing for the evolution of 
motivations to cooperate with a particular group of individuals (see also Boyd & Richerson, 
2009; Van Vugt & Park, 2010). Also, our perspective attempts to explain why individuals 
who consider themselves part of a group would be motivated to trust each other.  
Specifically, it attempts to explain why individuals seeking alliances might be motivated to 
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trust individuals who claim to be or are considered to be ingroup members. (In optimal 
distinctiveness theory, trust is a defining characteristic of ingroups, but it is not explained 
why this would be so.) Furthermore, the hypotheses regarding the distinction between private 
and public social identity (with each having a specific function in balancing group 
contributions and benefits) are novel and not predicted by optimal distinctiveness theory. 
To support their perspective, Brewer and Caporael (2006) referred to the findings that 
ingroup positivity does not necessarily predict outgroup negativity and that ingroup 
favoritism is often observed in the absence of outgroup prejudice. We believe there are a 
couple of crucial points to note. First, social context matters. It is not the case that all possible 
“intergroup” situations will give rise to antipathy toward outgroups. Humans likely possess 
mechanisms allowing them to learn (via socialization in their ingroups) which outgroups are 
the most insidious and demand vigilance. Thus, even within ecological contexts with multiple 
coalitional social identities, some outgroups may be distrusted more than others. Second, to 
say that a key evolutionary cause of ingroup cooperation was intergroup conflict is not to 
imply that, at the level of proximate psychological mechanisms, one necessarily should 
observe a correlation between ingroup favoritism and outgroup prejudice. While intergroup 
conflict may sometimes lead to both outcomes, antipathy toward outgroups is expected to be 
functionally strategic and thus separable from ingroup favoritism. 
 
6. Additional issues highlighted by an evolutionary perspective 
A key assumption in evolutionary psychology is that the mind is functionally 
specialized (Barrett & Kurzban, 2006). From such a perspective, one would predict that the 
mechanisms underlying coalitional social identity would be programmed to develop and 
become calibrated around the time when they are most functional (as it would be suboptimal 
to invest in the development of these mechanisms when they are not yet useful and when 
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resources can be channeled toward processes more important for survival). Thus, the 
development of social identity and possible sensitive periods in identity development are 
topics that fall within the scope of evolutionary analyses of social identity. If the mechanisms 
underlying coalitional social identity serve to forge group loyalty, then one might predict that 
the mechanisms underlying coalitional social identity will involve sensitive periods that 
coincide with when children have their first interactions with peers in the absence of parents 
(which plausibly is a situation in which they would need to forge alliances themselves, rather 
than relying on their parents for resources or cooperative benefits). For example, sports 
fandom—identifying as a supporter of a sports team—seems to be an expression of 
coalitional social identity (Winegard & Deaner, 2010). At least anecdotally, it would appear 
that fandom develops and solidifies during adolescence (the period of heightened 
independence from parents). The sports teams that one becomes a supporter of during 
adolescence (e.g., the Red Sox for a teenager growing up in Boston) seem to be those that one 
supports later in life, even after moving to a different city. (Note that one could make a 
similar argument for gender identities developing during adolescence, as from that age 
individuals might engage in potentially reproductive romantic relationships. However, gender 
identities actually develop at a much younger age. As this chapter focuses on tribal identities, 
we only mention this puzzle.) The development of social identity and the presence of 
sensitive periods may be a fruitful topic for further research. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 Psychological investigations of social identity might usefully make a distinction 
between social identities associated with coalitional (“tribal”) groups, such as ethnicity and 
social class, and identities associated with non-coalitional categories, such as sex and age, as 
the mechanisms underlying these different identities are unlikely to overlap completely. We 
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have described an evolutionary psychological perspective on coalitional social identity that 
started with a conjecture about an ultimate function of social identity. In a social ecology with 
intergroup competition, social identification may involve opportunity costs and, thus, both 
signal and motivate cooperation. Based on this conjecture about function, we derived 
predictions about form—the proximal psychology of social identification. Many questions 
remain. In particular, further research may examine whether social identity involves private 
social identities (for balancing costs and benefits of group membership) and public social 
identities (for strategically influencing the behaviors of others). 
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